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Combinatorial exchanges have existed for a long time in securities markets. In these
auctions buyers and sellers can place orders on combinations, or bundles of di¤erent securities.
These orders are conjunctive: they are matched only if the full bundle is available. On
business-to-business (B2B) exchanges, buyers have the choice to receive the same product
with di¤erent attributes; for instance the same product can be produced by di¤erent sellers.
A buyer indicates his preference by submitting a disjunctive order, where he speci…es how
much of the product he wants, and how much he values each attribute. Only the goods with
the best attributes and prices will be matched. This article considers a doubled-sided multi-
unit combinatorial auction for substitutes, that is, a uniform price auction where buyers and
sellers place both types of orders, conjunctive and disjunctive. We prove the existence of
a linear price which is both competitive and surplus-maximizing when goods are perfectly
divisible, and nearly so otherwise. We describe an algorithm to clear the market, which is
particularly e¢cient when the number of traders is large.
Keywords: Combinatorial auction, economic equilibrium
JEL Classi…cation: C62, C63, D44
11. Introduction
To quotedeVriesand Vohra (2003)”becauseofcomplementaritiesorsubstitutione¤ectsbetween
di¤erent assets, bidders have preferences not just for particular items, but for sets of items,
sometimes called bundles” or packages, or combinations. Combinatorial auctions are becoming
more and more popular with the Internet revolution, because, as noted by Klein (1997), one
e¤ect of the Internet is the ability to conduct complex auctions.
This paper focuses on the description of a (uniform price) ”double-sided, multiunit, com-
binatorial, with substitutes” auction, or DMCS auction 1. So far, the literature has surveyed
almost exclusively the single-sided combinatorial auction, that is, auctions with one seller, or
auctions with only one buyer (the procurement auction). Pinker et al (2003) in their survey are
”not aware of any true double online auctions beyond the …nancial and commodity markets”,
with the exception of www.chemconnect.com for the chemical industry. Pekec and Rothkopf
(2003) point out thepaucity of”documentation and public information on details of combinato-
rial auction design and implementations in the E-business arena”. The author, who worked as
a consultant for both the Eurex securities exchange and the Covisint automotive B2B exchange
had the privilegeto comparethe design issues facing each industry from within. It is well-known
that the main criticisms of procurement auctions is that they are focussed on ”squeezing the
suppliers” (Rothkopf and Harstad 1994). However, as Milgrom (2000) notes ”if the mechanism
is designed to extract all the entire surplus from the sellers, it will be di¢cult to attract sellers
to the auction site”. But why are securities exchanges double-sided (and even sometimes com-
binatorial, like Eurex, the largest options exchange in the world, or brie‡y, the Scandinavian
and Osaka exchanges) whereas B2B exchanges are still mostly one-sided? Besides monopolistic
behavior, the answer is to be found is the greater complexity of the goods o¤ered on a B2B
exchange, in particular the importance of di¤erent attributes in the di¤erent (substitute) items.
Webelievethat thelack ofdevelopment of double-sided B2B exchanges is partly due to a lack of
accepted best practices, whereas the relative lack of recent academic interest came partly from
the ignorance of the business issues of B2B exchanges (notable exceptions are Beil and Wein
(2003) on MS auctions, and Ba et al (2001) on DC auctions for public goods).
Any order in our DMCS auction consists of ”OR of XOR of AND bids”: a combination
order is a conjunctive, or ”AND” bid on complement items; the ”OR” operator implements
the (possible) multi-unit feature of any order, which can be partially matched, whereas the
disjunctive, or XOR parts allows to choose across substitutes. The choice between butter and
cannons can be expressed as ”butter XOR (2 wheels AND 1 gun) ”, expressing the fact that a
cannon is made of 3 parts: 2 wheels and 1 gun. Pekec and Rothkopf (2003) observe that such a
bidding languageisfully expressive. We believe that any bill ofmaterials can beimplemented in
such afashion, and that thislanguageisa good compromisebetween ‡exibility and practicability
(see Wohl 1997 for a discussion). In a manufacturing environment, it is also quite natural to
express the ”utility function” of the goods needed in terms of limit orders: the reservation or
limit price(s), for instance can beequated to theshadow prices, which most production planning
systems calculate anyway.
There are two main originalities in our design. The …rst one is the ”commoditization” of
1We use D for double-sided, M for multi-unit, C for combinatorial, and S for substitutes. When one of these
attributes is not present, we drop the corresponding letter. For instance, an MC auction is a one-sided, multiunit,
combinatorial, without substitutes auction. A”simple auction” is neither D, nor M, nor C, nor S. See section 3
for examples of our terminology.
2identical goods, which entails the law of one price: the price o¤ered for the …rst wheel has to be
identical to the price of the second wheel (we call such prices uniform or nondiscriminatory);
this is the reason why we call our auction ”multiunit”, as opposed to most other designs, which
are mostly variants ofthe DC, or CS auctions. As has been observed at Eurex, it is much easier
to implement a continuous-time combinatorial exchange (which, in terms of pricing algorithm
resembles a DC auction), than the ”opening-of-the day”, or batch clearing system (i.e., a DMC
auction). Second is the fact that, due to commoditization, combination vectors contain all
possible integer values, and not only f1;¡1;0g; in our example, a cannon needs 2 wheels.
We are not at liberty of saying how much this model resembles existing designs of improve-
ments to an existing B2B exchange, but the limitations of the design - most of them coming
from hard theoretical bounds - have been widely discussed with practitioners. They are: lack of
built-inincentivecompatibility, absenceofcompetitivepriceswhen indivisibilitiesaresigni…cant,
and the necessity of a tie-breaking mechanism. We brie‡y address each of these issues.
For one-sided auctions, Rothkopf and Harstad (1994) already pointed out the ”limitations
of traditional game-theoretic approaches to auction design”. Pekec and Rothkopf (2003) men-
tion that, for combinatorial auctions, ”any serious strategic analysis [..] of optimal bidding
strategies is impossible without mastery of the determination of auction winners”; in particular
the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves, (Vickrey 1961, Clarke 1971, Groves 1973) scheme is ”impractical”,
among other reasons because among others it is based on a simple model of beliefs, and that
it does not prevent shill bidding. The di¢culties of implementing incentive compatibility are
compounded in the more general setting of double-sided auctions. Such a mechanism exists for
DC auctions for public goods, see Ba et al (2001). Gul and Stachetti (2000) establish that the
Vickrey mechanism cannot be implemented in an English auction when buyers are strategicand
values are interdependent. In a DC auction, a Vickrey-type mechanism may not be budget-
balanced (Parkes et al 2001), i.e., the Vickrey payments may absorb more than the surplus.
Pekec and Rothkopf (2003) point out to the greater ”cooperative” (as opposed to collusive)
behavior of bidding in combinatorial auctions, thereby mitigating theincentive compatibility ef-
fect. To conclude, we do not claim that it is either possible or impossible in our DMCS auction
to build a mechanism to ensure incentive compatibility, but think that thewinner determination
problem should be addressed …rst. An incentive compatible mechanism should anyway, like in
McAfee (1992) for DM auctions, …rst calculate uniform prices (provided they exist) and then
o¤er side-payments.
When goods are indivisible, competitive prices may not exist (see e.g., Gul and Stachetti
1999, Bikchandani and Ostroy 1997). Dierker (1971) and Broome (1972) investigated the ”con-
vexifying” e¤ect of a large number of traders, which explains why ”various approximation al-
gorithms are likely to produce solutions which are not far from optimal” (Pekec and Rothkopf
2003). Satterthwaiteand Williams (1993) provethat theindivisibleequilibrium converges to the
perfectly divisible equilibrium when the number of traders increases in a DM auction. In par-
ticular, the allocation obtained by our algorithm is (approximately) e¢cient, and linear prices
(i.e., prices such that the price ofthe sum is the sum ofthe prices) obtain in a DM auction. This
robustness e¤ect was also observed by Isaac and James (1998). Parkes (2001) gives a system-
atic survey on the e¤ect of indivisibilities in combinatorial auctions. Pekec and Rothkopf again
(2003) note that linear (or additive) prices are the most popular approximation method. Inter-
estingly, another positive e¤ect of a large number of traders, besides making prices competitive,
is to make uniform price double auctions incentive compatible (Wilson 1985).
Pekecand Rothkopf(2003), notethat ties in an auction areundesirable. In a DMCS auction,
3tiesacrosssubstitutesturnout to beasmuchasanissueastiesacrossparticipants: weresolvethis
issueby requiring every participant to de…nea strict preferenceordering on all itemscontained in
an order. Technically, we implement this constraint by restricting clearing prices to be discrete,
as mentioned in Milgrom (2003) p. 317.
Our main contributions are to show that in a DMCS auction: (i) linear (nondiscriminatory)
competitive prices exist (ii) under mild conditions, any such pricemaximizessurpluswhen goods
are perfectly divisible (iii) under additional conditions, at least one linear competitive price is
surplus-maximizing when goods are indivisible (iv) there is an e¢cient algorithm to calculate a
linear competitive price2. In the indivisible case, surplus-maximizing (nondiscriminatory) prices
may not be competitive, i.e., some orders remain unful…lled although their limit price is strictly
better than the clearing price; the function of prices is therefore mostly informative. A high
auction volume reduces the number of unmatched orders at clearing, by the convexifying e¤ect
mentioned earlier, rendering prices competitive. Besides their ”algorithmic” importance, linear
prices have a crucial informative role in the economy, because auctions are usually a repetitive
business, and participate in the price discovery process.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we specify the DMCS auction and provide
theoretical results for the perfectly divisiblegood case. Wealso show how ourDMCSauction can
generalize Wohl’s (1997) price-contingent mechanism. In section 3, we discuss the indivisible
case, and relate our terminology and our results to the existing literature. In section 4, we
describe an algorithm to clear a DMCS auction and provide numerical results. All …gures, as
well as one table and one proof, are included in the online companion paper.
2. Divisible Goods
Notation The superscripts B and S apply to buyer, respectively seller-related functions,
such as demand/supply, allocation, ... Because of space constraints, we fully de…ne only the
buyer side in the text. The seller side can be de…ned symmetrically. The superscripts N and
C are mnemonics for primitive (normal) goods and, respectively, combinations. We sometimes







Doublesuperscripts areseparated by commas. [x] is the smallest integer larger than or equal to
x, whereas [x]+ is the maximum of x and 0. The vector ei is the i-th unit vector, and e is the
vector of ones. The indicator 1fAg is equal to one if A is true, and zero otherwise. N, Z and
R are the sets of positive integers, positive and negative integers, and real numbers. Other sets
are denoted by a calligraphic letter, e.g., B. Some of the notation used in sections 3 and 4 is
de…ned in the proofs of the theorems of section 2, which are in the appendix.
Combination Trading The exchange trades m primitive commodities (or goods) and
n¡mcombinations of commodities. Potentially, all combinations ofcommodities can betraded,
that is n · 2m ¡1. By de…nition, when zj 2 R units of commodity j are allocated to a buyer,
he physically receives A(i;j)zj of each primitive commodity i, with A(i; j) 2 Z. In the butter
vs cannon example given earlier, the clearing matrix would be:





1 0 0 0
0 1 0 2
0 0 1 1
3
5 (1)
wherethe1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th commoditiesarebutter, wheel, ri‡e, and cannonrespectively.
Thecoe¢cientsA(i;j) canbepositiveornegative. Forinstance, in theinterest-rateswapmarket,
the 1st (2nd) primitive commodity is a …xed (‡oating) bond, and a swap is equivalent to one










Order Speci…cation Because of space constraints, we refrain from de…ning preferences
in terms of utility and consumption set. We just mention that utility is transferable. In our
DMCS auction, buyers and sellers submit what we call a joint limit order, that is, a limit order
over possibly many substitute goods. When a buyer desires only one good, his limit order is
identical to a traditional limit order, or simple limit order. In a (joint limit) order, each buyer
(seller) speci…es a bid (an ask), a list of preferences over substitute goods (in case of price ties),
and the quantity of each good desired.
We require prices (bids and asks) to be integer 3. This is not very restrictive, since the
numeraire can be expressed in any unit ($, cent, thousandth of a cent,...). We will see that
a surplus-maximizing equilibrium allocates only the preferred good of each order in (i) a full
match (i.e., received quantity=limit quantity) when the preferred good’s marginal utility is
strictly positive (ii) a partial match when the latter is zero (iii) nothing, when the latter is
negative. Observe that such an allocation will be competitive: the case when not all the limit
quantity ofanorder’spreferred good can beallocated at equilibrium (i.e., onewheel ofa cannon)
can correspond only to the case where the preferred good’s marginal utility is zero, therefore,
it does not make sense to allocate the second-best good (butter), since its marginal utility is
negative.
We note that participants who want to reduce the risk of non-execution have a tendency
to submit many small orders with di¤erent limit prices; this has the e¤ect of reducing the
probability of having tie(s) at clearing. Since the pro…t realized from a sum of limit orders is
the sum of each limit orders pro…t, and since our equilibrium concept (surplus maximization) is
also additive, we may as well suppose that orders are anonymous. For notational ease also, we
suppose there is only one order per bid. Thus each buy (sell) order comprises:
² a limit price b (respectively s) 2 Rn
² a bid yB(b) (respectively yB(s)) 2 Nn
² a limit quantity qB(b) (respectively qS(s)) 2 Rn, with components positive, and not all
equal to zero.
3The advantage of this requirement is that demand and supply functions will turn out to be single-valued with
our tie-breaking mechanism if clearing prices are also integer.
5Marginal pro…t is equal to limit price minus clearing price. The limit price is di¤erent from
the bid only in order to guarantee the rank order of preferences in case of ties. That is, all
the quantities yB
i (b) ¡ bi are di¤erent, positive, and less than one. By convention, the limit
price is a price per unit of good exchanged, and not for the full lot. When good k is not a
possible substitute (for the buyer), the corresponding bid and limit price are set to ¡1. For
simplicity, we also use the term buyer (seller) for b (s). The set of all buyers (sellers) is denoted
B (respectively S).
Commodity i will be allocated to buyer b only if the clearing price p 2 PB
i (b), where:
PB
i (b) = fpjpi · yB
i (b);pi ·pj ¡yj(b) +yi(b) ¡1fyB
i (b) ¡bi >yB
j (b) ¡bjg;j 6= ig (2)
Theindicatorfunction in(2) isequal to zero ifi isthepreferred good at p, andzero otherwise.
In 2 dimensions, the intersection of PB
i (p) with the square containing all bids is a rectangular
trapeze, with the single non rectangular vertex located at y(b), where the two faces intersect at
an angle of 1350. Figure 1 illustrates this de…nition, in a case where good 2 is preferred to good
1. Note that, by construction PB
1 (b) does not overlap with PB
2 (b).







i (b)1fp 2 PB
i (b)g
For reasons that will become apparent later, it is convenient to introduce an operator pi;+ :
Rn ! Rn which purpose isto ”locate” the ”next” point of decreaseofdemand in the direction i,
starting fromp, keeping all otherdirections …xed (see …gure3). If j 6= i, weset then p
+;i














i (p) > FB





i (p) =1 is possible. We can then de…ne the incremental demand ¢FB by:
¢FB
i (p) = FB
i (p) ¡FB
i (pi;+(p))
It isthedemand ofthe”marginal buyers at p”, that is thosewho would not want commodity
i if its price marginally increased. We de…ne similarly aggregate supply FB, previous sell limit
price in the i direction pi;¡ and incremental supply ¢FS.
Allocation We de…ne an incremental buy allocation function ¢fB : Zn ! Rn. The value
¢fB
i (p) is equal to the allocated quantity at equilibrium of good i of all the ”marginal buyers”
at p, that is of all buyers b with p 2 P
B;bd
i (b), where P
B;bd
i (b) is the boundary of PB
i (b). The
buy allocation function fB : Zn ! Rn is de…ned indirectly (but unequivocally) by:
¢fB




i (p) = 0 if pi = 1
6Surplus Given a clearing price p and an allocation f, surplus is thesum of the incremental



















i (y; p) (4)
where










i (y;p) is the average pro…t realized by the ”marginal buyers” at y.
For de…niteness, wecan supposea proportional allocation between all the marginal buyers in
order to determine ®. What really matters in this de…nition however is that the average pro…t
is always strictly positive if yi > pi. In the special (but common) case where there is only one
marginal buyer b at price y, then:
®B
i (y;p) = bi ¡pi (5)
We give an example of the construction of surplus in …gure 2.























i (y)(pi ¡yi) ¸0 8y 2 P
S;bd
i (10)
A(fB(p) ¡fS(p)) =0 (11)
Constraints(9),(10) implement incentiverationality. Anequilibrium(p;f) issurplus-maximizing
if (p; f) solves (6)-(11) and competitive if:
FB




i (p) ¸ fS
i (p) ¸FS
i (pS;¡;i(p)) (13)
An equilibrium 4 is welfare-maximizing if it maximizes the sum of the values of the util-
ity functions of the participants. (For a full de…nition, please refer to appendix 1.) The only
4To lighten notation, we use the term ”equilibrium” even if the variables that compose a welfare-maximizing
equilibrium are di¤erent than the ones in a surplus-maximizing equilibrium. The mapping between them is
explained in the proof of theorem 2.1.
7di¤erence with a surplus-maximizing equilibrium is that (i) prices may be discriminatory in a
welfare-maximizing equilibrium (ii) prices are not constrained to be integer. It is well-known
that, in simple D auctions (where A = I, and all orders are simple), the three equilibrium
concepts coincide, mutatis mutandis. We now investigate the relationships between these con-
cepts in DMCS auctions. Because of the tie-breaking rule, a surplus-maximizing equilibrium
may not be welfare-maximizing, but thedi¤erence between the optimal welfare and the optimal
surplus is small. As mentioned earlier, when there are many orders, utilities become almost
strictly concave and ties disappear, therefore the gap between the optimal welfare and surplus
also disappears.
PROPOSITION 2.1. Every surplus-maximizing equilibrium (p;f) is competitive.
DEFINITION: An equilibrium (p; f) is linear if p =ATpN.
THEOREM 2.1. If a surplus-maximizing equilibrium (p; f) is such that
f(p) >0 (14)
then it is linear.
Condition (14) is mild. It ensures that, at equilibrium, all goods are traded. Whereas
surplus-maximizing equilibria obviously exist, theorem 2.1. does not guarantee the existence of
a linear competitive equilibrium, to which we now turn. Note that the proof of the theorem is
constructive and, as we shall see in section 4, yields an e¢cient algorithm to calculate a linear
competitive equilibrium.
THEOREM 2.2. There exists a linear competitive equilibrium (p;f) such that p 2 Rn.





A(i; j)ni ni 2 Z
If a linear equilibrium exists, it makes sense for traders to place combination-multiple bids
and asks. We also remind the reader that the unit of numeraire can be very small, so that
combination-multiple prices can be made dense in Rn, the space of prices expressed in $.
COROLLARY. If bids and asks are combination-multiples, there exists a linear competitive
equilibrium (p0; f) such that p0 2 Zn.






Since bids and asks are combination-multiples, (p0; f) is linear.
8DEFINITION: We say that goods are one-to-one buy substitutes if for all b 2 B; qB
i (b) 2
f0;qBg.
Goods areone-to-onebuy substitutes ifthe buyer wants thesamequantity ofeach substitute.
For a baker, milk and cream (expressed in ounces) are not one-to-one substitutes, but a carton
of 10 pints of milk is a one-to-one substitute of a carton of 1 pint of cream. This one-to-one
substitution requirement is in practice not very restrictive: a car manufacturer needs 4 wheels
per car; she has no real need for 4 aluminum wheels XOR 5 steel wheels.
THEOREM 2.3. If goods are one-to-one buy substitutes and sellers submit only simple limit
orders, the set of linear competitive prices is connected.
PROOF: In the companion paper.
In theorem 2.3, prices belong to Zn. By ”connected” we mean, that the price of every
primitivegood must beeither (i) unique or (ii) located at thevertex ofa unit cube that contains
at least one other price linearcompetitiveprice as a vertex. In termsofalgorithms, this theorem
greatly facilitates the search of all equilibria. We suspect that this result could be used to show
that all linear competitive equilibria yield the same surplus. We also suspect that theorem 2.3
would hold true if sellers were allowed to submit joint limit orders. In practice though, we
experienced that few sellers need to trade substitutes.
Application: Price-Contingent Orders Wohl (1997) discusses an exchange mechanism
where traders can submit market orders and limit orders contingent on the price of an index.
One advantage of our DMCS is to generalize thismechanism to orderscontingent on thepriceof
several indices. Suppose p1;:::;pm arethe prices of thenormal securities, whereas pm+1; :::;pn are
theprices ofn¡mindices. Weformally add toourtradeablesecurity list securitiesn+1;:::; n+m
which correspond to ”negative indices”: buying security pn+j (j ¸ 1) is equivalent to selling
index n+1¡j. A linear equilibrium will result then in:
pn+j =¡pn+1¡j (16)
A trader wishing to buy a number q of security k · m at price ¯k only if the prices of
indices m+1;::; n are (respectively) less than ¯m+1;::; ¯n will therefore do it only if the prices
of negative indices n +1;:::; n+ m are (respectively) more than ¡¯m+1;::; ¡¯n. In all other



























j 2 fm+1;::; ng
else
(18)
Theorem 2.2 therefore proves that an equilibrium exists that respects the buyer’s order,
even when there is no trading activity on the combinations. Besides, all the cumbersome data-
handling contained in (17) to (18) can be abstracted from the user in a software program.
93. Indivisible Goods
Many researchers have worked on the question of existence of a nonempty core or of an equilib-
rium of ”market games”, where indivisible goods are traded. To illustrate our terminology, the
horse market of Bohm-Bawerk is a D auction, whereas the house market is a DS auction. Both
examples are described in Shapley and Shubik (1972). The counterexample in the same article,
where each buyer wants 3 houses if they are all on the same row is a DCS auction. The FCC
auction analyzed by Rothkopf et al (1998) is a C auction.
Whenutility istransferable, competitiveequilibriaexist inthefollowing cases: D auctionwith
2 goods (Quinzii 1984 and Gale1984), DM auction with 2 goods (Henry 1970), DM auction with
single-unit bids on one side (Kaneko et al 1986), DS auction when goods are gross substitutes
(Kelso and Crawford 1982, Gul and Stachetti 1999), DMS auctions with polymatroidal cost
functions (Danilov, Koshevoi and Lang 2003), DC auctions with supermodular preferences5
(Bikchandani and Mamer 1997). Examples where equilibria may not exist are: general DMS
auction (Henry 1970) and general DCS auction (Bikchandani and Ostroy 1997). The latter
result removes all hope to …nd an equilibrium price for a DMCS auction, even if we relax the
law of one price (as is done in one-sided auctions) or the integrality of prices. We say that an
equilibrium (p; f) is subcompetitive if only (7) to (11) hold. The following statement is then
trivial:
PROPOSITION 3.1. Every surplus-maximizing equilibrium (p;f) is subcompetitive.
A weaker form of theorem 2.1 exists in the indivisible case, where (14) is replaced by a
stronger condition, the maximal synthetic trade condition, which is de…ned in the appendix.
Roughly speaking, it requires that, at an equilibrium, a buy order for a combination cannot be
matched only with a sell order of the same combination.
THEOREM3.1. Suppose all bids andasks are combination-multiples. If asurplus-maximizing
equilibrium (p;f) satis…es the maximal synthetic trade condition, then it is linear.
The proof of theorem 3.1 is identical to the proof of theorem 2.1, because, by assumption,
f is indivisible, and the corresponding welfare-maximizing problem has no duality gap. We
note that the indivisibility requirement potentially reduces the number of synthetic trades and
therefore the likelihood that a linear competitive equilibrium be surplus-maximizing.
4. Algorithms
The proof of theorem 2.2 is constructive, and can be applied to determine a linear competitive
equilibrium in the perfectly divisiblecase. As described in Schellhorn fora DMC auction (1997),
weusetheEaves-Saigal algorithm (Eaves1972) to computethe…xed point ofthecorrespondence
F, which is de…ned in the proof of theorem 2.1. Convergence is achieved in a …nite number of
steps. The computational di¤erencesbetween determining the equilibrium ofDMC and a DMCS
auction are negligible. We therefore report without proof the results on algorithm complexity
contained in our previous article. The average number of arithmetic operations of the …xed
point algorithm is:
5Or, equivalently, if the same equilibrium exists in the perfectly divisible case.
10TFP = O(m5 +mn3) (19)
where weusethe common approximation that the averagenumber of iterations oftheprimal
simplex method is proportional to the number of rows (see e.g. Dantzig 1963). The benchmark
against which the …xed point algorithm needs to be compared is the welfare-maximizing6 linear
program (28),(29),(32). For simplicity, we assume that the number of buyers t is equal to the
number of sellers, and that for all buyers and sellers, all goods are substitutes. The maximum
number of normal trades xN is equal to nt2, and the maximum number of synthetic trades xC
is 2(n¡m)t!=n! if t ¸ n. Using Stirling’s formula, the average number of arithmetic operations








Taking t =200;m = 10; n= 100, we obtain for instance TFP ¼ 1012 and TPL ¼10218. Table
1 in the companion paper shows some experimental comparisons of the 2 algorithms in the case
m =1, n =2 for a DMC. With only 30 traders, our …xed point algorithm is already 2 orders of
magnitude faster.
In the indivisible case, a natural algorithm would be to …rst look for the perfectly divisible
solution, and then search in the neighborhood of the solution for a linear indivisible allocation
(p;f), which gives us a lower bound for the optimal surplus. In general, theknowledge of a good
lower bound accelerates the calculation of the solution of a mathematical program. Rothkopf
et al (1998) observe that a C auction is equivalent to the set-packing problem on a hypergraph,
which is NP-hard; it is therefore critical to design good heuristics for the DMCS auction.
Finally, it may not be optimal for the exchange to clear the whole market in batch: the
indivisibility requirement may severely hamper thebene…ts ofcombinatorial trading, by reducing
the quantity of synthetic trades. One can then envision a sequential auction, where in the …rst
round, integer allocations are traded and removed from the order books. In the second round,
only the non-integer allocations that would have been traded if thegoods had been divisible are
sent back, using non-combinatorial orders. This would then realize a compromise between the
risk of non-execution and the risk of owning non-complementary items.
5. Conclusion
We showed in this article that linear competitive prices exist, and can be used to clear a DMCS
auction. When goods are perfectly divisible it is di¢cult to argue against this equilibrium con-
cept, especially if an incentive-compatible mechanism is superposed to the clearing mechanism.
This equilibrium is not only surplus-maximizing, non-discriminatory (and therefore not illegal)
but, if participants bid their true reservation value, is the best way to reveal thegood’s intrinsic
value. If the clearing price is not linear, arbitrageurswill exchangegoods after theauction clears
for positive riskless pro…t. Finally, these types of prices havea clear algorithmic advantage over
other approaches: because of the aggregation of several orders into generalized demand and
supply functions, our algorithm is particularly e¢cient when the number ofparticipants is large.
6For a DMC both algorithms yield the same welfare.
11Finally, wenotethat non-discriminatory linear pricesexist in DMC auctionsformoregeneral
types of orders (Schellhorn 1995), i.e., orders corresponding to general concave utility functions.
The same fact should hold true for DMCS auctions.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2.1
Since an allocation must be positive, we can express the constraints (7)(8) in terms of alloca-
tion/demand/supply, instead of incremental allocation/demand/supply, that is, in (7)(8), get







i (p) ¡pi) = ®B
i (pB;+;i(p);p) ¡®B
i (p; p) (21)
where ¸B
i (p+;i(p)) ¸0 is the multiplier of equation (7), and ºB
i (p+;i(p)) ¸0 the multiplier of
(9). Since p
B;+;i
i (p) >pi and ®B
i (p; p) = 0, we have ¸B
i (pB;+;i(p)) > 0, and, by complementary
slackness:
fB
i (pB;+;i(p)) = FB
i (pB;+;i(p)) (22)
Proof of Theorem 2.1
Given a surplus-maximizing allocation f, we can construct another set of orders (a ”modi…ed
economy”), in such a way that (i) all limit orders are simple (ii) all orders are matched at the
optimum (iii) the optimal equilibrium and surplus of the modi…ed and the original economy
coincide (iv) we group buyers (and sellers) with the same bids (asks). As a consequence of the
fact that all orders are simple, (5) holds for all y with yi = bi. We then write uB(i;b) instead
of ®B
i (y;p) for the marginal utility (or pro…t) of such a buyer b, for clarity. Marginal utilities of
buyers and sellers are then:
uB(i; b) = bi¡pi (23)
uS(i;s) = pi¡si (24)
As a consequence of the full matching of every order, the marginal allocation ¢fB
i (y) is
equal to qB













i uS(i; s) (25)
We take a detour to de…ne a notion (the notion of a minimal set of synthetics) that will be
useful in theproofoftheorem3.1. Twotypesoftradesemanatefrom theclearing process: normal
12trades and synthetic trades. In a normal trade xN(i; b;s) seller s gives a quantity xN(i; b; s) of
good i to buyer b. In a synthetic trade xC(w;d), seller dS
k gives a quantity wS
k xC(w;d) of good k
to buyer dB
k . Each trader group dB(dS) 2 Rn2
is a vector of buyers (sellers), with the following
restrictions: (i) the component k of vector dB
k is buyer b 2 fb0 2 Bjb0
k 6=¡1g[fnBg where fnBg
is the ”null-buyer” singleton, that is, a limit price vector with all components equal to ¡1 (ii)
two components of dB
l and dB
k are identical if and only if dB




, where 0 · wB; wS 2 Rn, corresponds to a self-su¢cient exchange of








j A(i; j) 8i (26)
wBwS = 0 (27)
Condition (27) is not necessary, but it facilitates intuition. We thus de…ne a minimal set of
synthetics W =fw1; :::;w2n¡2mg, which is an ordered set of synthetic vectors such that:
² there exists a collection of positive scalars xC(wk;:) with
Pn¡m
k=1 xC(wk;:)(wk;B ¡ wk;S)
spanning the null set of A
² the second half of the set consists of the same synthetic trade as the …rst half, but ”per-




In other terms, fwk;B ¡wk;Sg for k = 1::n¡m is a basis of the null set of A. We call D,
the set of dealer groups, and DB
i;b the set of all dealer groups dB such that dB
i =b. Normal and











i xC(wk;d) = qB











i xC(wk;d) = qS
i (s) 8(i;s) (29)
We de…ne the marginal utility of each trade:























13An equilibrium x is welfare-maximizing for a DMC auction if it maximizes (32) under the
constraints (28) to (31). With these de…nitions, it is easy to see that the market clearing
condition (11) and the limit quantity constraints (7),(8) hold if (28), (29) hold. Since any more
complicated synthetic trade can be decomposed in these basic trades, then (11) holds only if
(28), (29) hold for some x. Incentive rationality (9),(10) requires:




i uB(i; b) +wS
i uS(i;s) ¸ °C(w;d) (34)
Since the welfare-maximizing problem is less constrained than the surplus-maximizing problem,
optimal welfare is higher than or equal to optimal surplus in (4). By duality, optimal welfare W
is less than of equal to the surplus S in (25), over the domain de…ned by (33)(34) and positivity
of u. The only possibility, namely W = S , is that u ¸ 0 minimizes (25) under (33)(34).
Necessary and su¢cient conditions for (p;f) to be surplus-maximizing are then (28) to (31),
(33)(34), positivity of u and:








i ) ¡°C(w;d)) = 0 (36)
Inserting (31), (23), and (24) in (36) results in:
xC(w; d)(pt(wk;B ¡wk;S)) = 0 (37)
A su¢cient condition for p to be linear is that, for all wk 2 W:
pt(wk;B ¡wk;S) =0 (38)
Let ¹ k = k +n¡m. Clearly, if for each k = 1::n ¡m there exists d 2 D such that either
xC(wk; d) orxC(w
¹ k; d) is strictly positive, thenp is linear. Wenow verify that underthestronger
condition (14), which is much easier to verify computationally, p must also be linear. We de…ne
a particular minimal set of synthetics WN followingly. For all k =1::n and ¹ k =k +n¡m then
wk (w
¹ k) is the synthetic vector consisting of buying (selling) one unit of combination k +m,

































Let us …x k and ¹ k = k+n¡m. Supposethat for all d 2 D and any optimal x(corresponding
to the minimal set of synthetics WN) we have:
xC(wk;d) = xC(w
¹ k;d) =0 (41)
14Therefore xN(i; b; s) is equal to qB(i; b; s) (which is strictly positive by 14)for all b and s.
As a consequence the optimal basis (in terms of linear programming) does not include either
xC(wk; d) or xC(w
¹ k;d). Let us identify all goods i such that w
B;k
i > 0. By (14) there exists
for each of these goods a buyer who is fully matched. We pick for each good i the buyer with
the lowest limit price, which we call b¤(i). We perform the symmetric operation for all sellers
of primitive goods i such that w
S;k
i > 0. We now decrease (increase) the limit prices of the
economy for all these ”star” buyers (sellers), to obtain new limit prices ¹ b¤(i) and ¹ s¤(i) equal to
the clearing price, i.e.:
b¤(i) ! ¹ b¤(i) = pi (42)
s¤(i) ! ¹ s¤(i) =pi (43)
It is known from sensitivity analysis in linear programming that, provided the solution
remains feasible, the current basis remains optimal. We call d¤ the dealer group such that
d
B;¤
i =¹ b¤(i) and d
S;¤















i ) ¸0 (44)
But, by construction, uB(i;d
B;¤
i ) =uS(i; d
S;¤
i ) = 0, therefore:





























We can do the same operation for the synthetic vector w





Therefore the price of combination k +m is linear, and the same reasoning can be applied
to all other combinations.
15Proof of Theorem 2.2
The competitive demand/supply correspondence (which maps prices to the competitive alloca-
tion respecting (12)(13)) is unfortunately not upper hemi-continuous. We therefore construct
two continuous functions F0 and D0 in such a way that their convex combination is a subset of
the range of the competitive demand/supply correspondence. Let 0 · ± < 1






















p +±ei 2 PB
i (b)
p 2 Pi(b); p+±ei = 2 PB





























i (b); p+2±ei = 2 PB


















qB;inf(b; p) ¡qB;sup(b; p)
which areobviously continuous (see…gure3 foran illustration ofthe1-good case). Therefore,
FB
i (p) ¸FB0






This shows that the convex combination f =F
0(p)+¿D0(p), with 0 · ¿ ·e is competitive.
Let X ½ Rm be a box such that ATX contains all the bids and asks. We now de…ne as in
Schellhorn (1997) a correspondence F : X ! 2X. Its value is the set of all prices f¹ pg such that















) = 0 (56)













i (¼) +1 (58)
0 · ¿0 ·e (59)
Observe that the constraint correspondence ° that maps p to the domain determined by
(54) to (59) is compact-valued. Constraint (58) was introduced just to ensure compactness of
the latter, even if this constraint is never tight at the optimum. Clearly each constraint in (54)
to (59) is both upper and lower hemi-continuous, since F0 and D0 are continuous. Therefore,
by theorem 3 p. 120 in Berge (1959), ° is also continuous. By Berge’s maximum theorem, F
is closed and upper hemi-continuous. Clearly, (f0; p0;¿) =(0; p; 0) is always feasible for (54) to
(59), so that F(p) is non-empty. Since F(p) is a section of the solution-set of a convex program,
it is convex and compact-valued. Kakutani’s …xed point theorem asserts then the existence ofa
…xed point of F. Let ¸B ¸0; ¸S ¸0; ¹; º ¸ 0 be the multipliers of relations (54) to (57). The






















Since the matrix in (60) has full rank, the only solution is ¸ =e+º ¸ 0. By complementary
slackness, this imposes:
¹ f =F(pTA) +¿D0(pTA)
Therefore (¹ p; ¹ f) is competitive.
The Maximal Synthetic Trade Condition
DEFINITION: We say that a surplus-maximizing equilibrium (p;f) satis…es the maximal syn-
thetic trade condition ifthereexistsa minimal (ordered) set ofsyntheticsW =fw1;::; w2n¡2mgand
a welfare-optimal allocation x of the corresponding modi…ed economy such that, for all k =
1::n¡m
(i) either xC(wk; d) >0, for some d 2 D
(ii) or xC(w
¹ k;d) > 0 , with ¹ k =k +n¡m for some d 2 D
The de…nitions of D, of a minimal set of synthetics, and of the modi…ed economy corre-
sponding to an equilibrium are in the proof of theorem 2.1 above.
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